Family Law – Fall 2001, U of Iowa –
Prof. Estin
I. Marital
and Cohabitation Agreements
A.
Premarital Agreements
1.
Early on, couples could not contract around divorce laws.
2.
No-fault divorce laws treated marriage as K.
3.
Antenuptial agreements often treated like K, but with special
rules. (Fletcher)
4.
Three-part test for enforceability of a antenuptial agreement
(Fletcher):
a)
Entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or
overreaching
(1)
“overreaching” – on party outwits or cheats the other “by
artifice or cunning, or by exploiting a significant disparity in understanding
of the nature of the transaction.
b)
Full disclosure, or full knowledge and understanding of the
nature, value, and extent of the prospective spouse’s property
(1)
Need not be exact, just “full and fair”
c)
If the terms do not promote or encourage divorce or
profiteering by divorce.
5.
If assets are distributed disproportionally upon death, burden
of proving full disclosure of assets falls on party asserting validity
(Fletcher – this condition met where spouse had full opportunity to review
agreement and refused chance to have her own counsel review it). This is
justified because:
a)
Parties stand in fiduciary relationship;
b)
Statutory rights to distribution are presumptive and agreement
negates them;
6.
Burden of proving fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching
remains with challenger of agreement (Fletcher).
7.
If agreement gives one party disproportionate amount of assets
upon distribution, financially disadvantaged party must have meaningful
opportunity to consult with counsel (id.).
a)
If agreement is presented right before wedding ceremony,
presumption of overreaching exists if postponement of wedding would cause
significant hardship.
8.
Dead Man’s statute may make it difficult to make a claim
against the estate of deceased spouse.
9.
Antenuptial agreements are subject to the statute of frauds,
meaning promises made in contemplation of marriage must be in writing.
10.
ERISA requires that waiver of rights meeting that statute’s
requirements, prenuptial is not enough.
11.
Inheritance rights not waived if agreement does not include
necessary language, e.g., “in the event of death of ___.”
12.
Parties should have disclosure of each other’s financial
status as well as full nature of statutory rights that they are forgoing.
(Simeone)
13.
Lack of actual understanding of assets and statutory rights,
once disclosed, does not invalidate agreement.
Each party is responsible to him or herself. (Id.).
14.
Court might refuse to review reasonableness of terms, since
parties entered marriage depending on enforcement (Simeone).
15.
If disclosure was not given, a material representation in the
inducement may be argued (id.)
16.
If full disclosure is recited in agreement, presumption is in
favor of proponent (Id.). Presumption
can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
17.
See UPAA (CB 34). See
IC 596.8; 596.5(2)
18.
Common law is that K imposes general or unlimited restraint on
marriage it is invalid, but restraints will be upheld if reasonable and
limited. (CB 34).
19.
Courts generally unwilling to enforce agreements that regulate
matters taking place during marriage (CB 35).
20.
Elements of a good agreement:
a)
Disclosure
b)
Timing – get it done before wedding if possible
c)
Default support provision
d)
Separate counsel for both partners
e)
Careful drafting – beware of ambiguity, tax and probate laws,
dead man’s statues
21.
Parties to an antenuptial agreement are in fiduciary
relationship, so they must act in good faith, with a high degree of fairness
and disclosure of all circumstances which bear materially on the antenuptial
agreement. (Newman)
22.
Whether agreement is valid or not must be determined by
examining the time at which it was executed, not the time of enforcement (id.).
23.
Once appropriate tests are met, parties are free of make any
arrangment, including full waiver of rights to each other’s property (id.).
24.
Maintance provisions, as opposed to property provisions, might
lose validity with changing circumstances, and become voidable for
unconscionability, even if made in good faith at time of execution (Id.).
a)
Unconscionabiltiy would exist where one spouse is left without
ability to meet reasonable needs.
25.
Drafter of agreement should use choice-of-law clause.
B.
Cohabitation Agreements
1.
In absence of an express K, courts should look to whether
conduct of parties demonstrates an implied K, agreement of partnership/joint
venture, or some other tacit understanding (Marvin)
2.
Quantum meruit, resulting or constructive trusts may be used
when warranted by facts of case. (id.)
3.
Nonmarital partners may contract to share property (id.) Such agreements fail only to extent they
rest upon consideration of sexual services (id.).
4.
De facto family relationship will not be treated as de jure
(id.)
5.
No reason to presume services are rendered as a gift; better
to presume consideration is involved. (id.)
6.
Parties lawful expectations should be fulfilled through
available remedies (id.)
7.
No statutory schemes address cohabiting couples.
8.
In NY, express agreements b/t unmarried persons living
together are enforceable provided that illicit sexual relations are not part of
the consideration involved. (Morone).
9.
K can be found to exist even if services are of a type more
likely to result from personal bond and if periodic payments were not made
(id.). However, if services are of such
a type, and there is no express K, an implied K will not result where services
appear to have been rendered gratuitously (id.).
10.
Any agreement for
support between unmarried adults should or must be in writing (Posik). Some states have a statute of frauds
requiring this.
11.
Mere fact of cohabitation does not establish a fiduciary
relationship.
II. Marriage
A.
Marital & Individual Privacy
1.
A constitutional right to privacy protects the rights of
individuals and married couples alike to use contraception for purposes of
reproductive control (Griswold, Eisenstadt)
a)
This right, though not specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, is within the “penumbra” of privacy rights not specifically mentioned.
b)
This right is a substantive due process right subject to
strict scrutiny analysis.
c)
Treating unmarried differently from married violated EP.
d)
Scope of marital privacy remains unrefined
2.
Reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere
with decisions to marry are permissible (Zablocki dictum)
3.
Ban on contraception per se impermissible under Eisenstadt,
but if primary justification is public health or deterring premarital sex, ban
might be upheld.
4.
There is no right to purely sexual privacy (bowers – sodomy
ban upheld).
a)
Dissent called for spatial and decisional privacy
b)
Court personnel has changed since decision rendered; 2 maj
remain, one dissenter.
c)
Many states protect sexual privacy to a greater extent than
Supreme Court
5.
In order to determine whether a right is fundamental, it must
be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and tradition. (id.)
6.
Same-sex couples lack access to the institution of marriage,
so they cannot claim the same rights and obligations
B.
Formal and Informal Marriage
1.
A “ceremonial marriage” is a wedding or marriage performed by
a religious or civil authority with the usual or customary ceremony or
formalities. (Staudenmeyer)
2.
A number of jurisdictions recognize “common law marriage,”
entered into without ceremony.
Requirments (id.):
a)
Exchange of words in present tense with intent that legal
relationship of marriage be created between W and H.
(1)
No specific form of words required
b)
Some states require couple to hold themselves out as married
3.
Judicial policy favors validation of marriage wherever
possible (e.g. Litchfield – marriage record not filed, marriage valid
nonetheless). Party expectations
support validation.
4.
Marriage may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
5.
The doctrine of “necessaries” requires spouse to provide
partner with the necessities of life, and to contract debts pertaining thereto
(see id.).
6.
Marriage license required for cermonial marriage, i.e. IC 595.3. Purposes of license requirement:
a)
Public record/notice
b)
Protection against bigamy
c)
Make sure of age
d)
Prevent fools from rushing in
7.
Iowa allows exceptions to solemnization requirement under IC
595.17, 595.11
8.
Iowa recognized foreign marriages pursuant to 595.20
a)
Whether recognition of this sort is required has not been
addressed by Supreme Court
9.
Marriage that is valid in state or country where it’s
celebrated is valid in [i.e. Virginia] (lex loci contractus), unless repugnant
to public policy. (Farah)
10.
A marriage that is invalid where celebrated is invalid
everywhere (id. – marriage by proxy invalid in England, so VA won’t recognize
it)
a)
Validity of marriage by proxy is determined by construction of
statutes governing and obtaining the license and performance of the ceremony.
b)
Remember that common law marriage concept might provide rescue
11.
Restatement presents different rule than lex loci: “validity determined by local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage.”
Factors:
a)
The needs of the interstate and international systems
b)
The relevant policies of the forum
c)
The relevant policies underlying the particular field of law
d)
Certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result
e)
Ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
12.
Burden to prove marriage is on party alleging it, and in the
case of a claim of common law marriage when parties are able to testify
regarding exchange of words, the burden
is especially heavy – “great scrutiny” will be applied (Staudenmeyer).
a)
However, in absence of availability of testimony regarding the
exchange of words required, rebuttable presumption in favor of marriage resides
if party can prove:
(1)
Constant cohabitation
(2)
Broad and general reputation of marriage
b)
When facing testimony regarding exchange of words, party
alleging marriage can still introduce evidence of cohabitation and reputation,
but this alone will be insufficient to carry burden of proving marriage.
13.
Even states that don’t permit common law marriage might
recognize common law marriages contracted in other states (i.e. Renshaw)
a)
States with strong policy against common law marriage won’t
recognize the marriage if the couple was in a non-common-law-marriage state at
the time the marriage was allegedly contracted.
14.
Common law marriage is one tool for exercising validation
policy.
15.
Federal laws rely on state laws to delineate marital status
and other family relationships.
16.
Putative marriage exists where an impediment make the marriage
void or voidable and one or both parties are ignorant of the impediment (and
has/have thus acted in good faith).
a)
Innocent party entitled to rights incident to marriage
b)
No cohabitation requirement
C.
Annulment and restrictions on marriage
1.
Marriage not permitted in any state if either party has prior
marriage that has not been terminated by death or divorce. A person may have but a single spouse at a
time.
2.
Marriage not permitted if parties are related within given
degree of blood or marriage (varies from state to state).
3.
Voidable, but not void, marriage exists where:
a)
One party is a minor
b)
Party lacks capacity to consent or consummate the marriage
c)
Consent induced by fraud or duress or as jest or dare
4.
Proceedings for annulment may be brought in case of void or voidable
marriage.
5.
Second or subsequent marriage is very strongly presumed to be
valid. Party asserting invalidity has
burden of proof (Chandler):
a)
Party must show that every reasonable possibility of validity
is negatived
b)
Evidence against validity must be clear, strong, and
satisfactory and so persuasive as to leave room for no reasonable doubt. Must be better than proof from which “mere
inferences” may be drawn.
6.
Other presumptions flowing from fact that marriage is proved
include (CB 128):
a)
Marriage was contracted in good faith
b)
Marriage was performed by person having authority
c)
Parties had capacity to marry
7.
If impediment to marriage is removed, previously invalid
marriage might become a valid common-law marriage if both parties were
genuinely ignorant of impediment
8.
Rationales for preferring to uphold subsequent marriage (Dolan
– no reason not to give old lady death benefits):
a)
Upholding legitimacy
b)
Allowing de facto spouse to participate in estate
c)
Validation
9.
People presumed not to have knowingly committed bigamy(id.),
considering criminal penalties and illegitimacy.
10.
Even if second marriage is not criminally bigamous, it is not
necessarily valid (CB 132).
11.
Validity of marriage generally determined by law of place
where it is celebrated (May’s Estate).
Exceptions include:
a)
Cases within prohibition of positive law
b)
Cases involving polygamy
c)
Cases involving incest in a degree generally regarded as in
prohibition of natural law
12.
If legislature fails to proscribe certain marriages that
violate positive law but are valid where contracted, validity will be upheld
(id. – uncle married niece validly under RI law, recognized in NY).
a)
Marriage Evasion Act achieves opposite result by voiding
incestuous marriages even if valid where contracted.
13.
Arguments against incest include genetic sanctity and
preservation of family relationships.
14.
Laws setting different marriage ages for men and women
probably violate the equal protection clause.
15.
Duress usually a ground for annulment that makes marriage
voidable but not void.
16.
Historically, anulment was limited for cases involving frauds
that went to the “essentials” of the marriage (Reynolds – undisclosed pregnancy
by outside party voids marriage).
17.
Court of equity can annul fruadulent marriage, if defendant
has commited fraud of extreme nature going to an essential of the marriage
(materiality test) (V.J.S.; Haake)
a)
What is an “essential” is determined subjectively on a
case-by-case basis, since what’s essential to one person differs from what’s
essential to another (i.e., commitment never to have children).
b)
Fraud should be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
c)
Test whether fraud induced consent (would P have not married D
but for fraudulent representation)
d)
Test whether essential purpose for marrying is defeated (i.e.
desire to live with good, law-abiding man)
18.
See IC 595.2, 595.19, 595.20, 548.29, 598.32
a)
Innocent party can annul marriage yet get divorce remedies
19.
Annulment might be preferred over divorce for financial,
religious, or reputational purposes
20.
Anullment typically results in declaration that marriage never
existed, since it was void ab initio or is nullified retroactively.
a)
Most states have passed laws preserving legitimacy of children
to the marriage
21.
Religious annulment and divorce do not count for civil
purposes.
D.
Same Sex marriage
1.
Baker v. Vermont held, under the Vermont constitution, that
the rights and benefits of marriage must flow to everyone because government
institutions exist for all citizens.
The opinion did not decide whether marriage itself can be denied to
same-sex couples. Considerations
analyzed were
a)
Significance of benefits and protections of challenged law
b)
Whether ommissions of members of the commuinty from the
benefits and protections of the challenged law promote the government’s stated
goals; and
c)
Whether the classification is significantly underinclusive or
overinclusive
2.
Defense of Marriage Act, passed by Congress, defines marriage
as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and
protects states from having to recognize same sex marriages contracted in other
states. FF&C issue has not been
tested.
III. Nonmarital
Children
A.
Legitimacy
1.
At common law, illegitimate children were “filius nullius” –
Children of no one.
2.
Legitimate children (parents married when born or conceived)
automatically receive all rights, benefits, protections flowing from
parent-child relationship
a)
Support
b)
Inheritance
c)
Public benefits (i.e. worker’s comp.)
d)
Right to sue for wrongful death
3.
Chief disability of illegitimacy was lack of inheritance
rights.
4.
Illegitimate children are “persons” entitled to equal
protection (Levy).
5.
Inviduous discrimination against illegitimates cannot be
permitted (child has no control or responsibility over status) (e.g. id. –
illegitimate children may file wrongful death suit for loss of mother, no
reason to let torfeasor go free).
6.
State courts might interpret statutes regarding “children” as
only covering legitimates (see id.).
7.
Some laws discriminating against illegitimates remain
constitutional (Labine – inheritance law requiring proof or acknowledgment of
paternity within two years of upheld as rationally related to an important
government objective of administrative convenience, and child could be
protected from discrimination by father).
8.
Classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to
intermediate scrutiny that is not “toothless.” (Trimble) Must be substantially related to permissible
state interests. (Lalli – avoiding fradulent assertions of paternity in
adminstration of estates a permissible end)
9.
Law that gives illegitimate no chance of avoiding discrimination
is likely to be struck (Trimble – Illinois statute that requires intermarriage
of parents for inheritance rights too broad, violates EP).
10.
See UPC 2-114 (CB 271); Uniform Parentage Act (CB 1079).
11.
Certain rights flow from being a child’s parent (Michael H.):
a)
Child’s care
b)
Right to child’s services and earnings
c)
Right to direct child’s activities
d)
Right to decide regarding control, education, and health of
child
e)
Right and duty to prepare child for additional obligations
(i.e. good citizenship)
12.
The right to rear one’s biological child is not a “fundamental
liberty” rooted in traditions and conscious (id. – W has affair, has child by
paramour, paramour has no constitutional right to participate in the child’s
life).
13.
Traditional marital family is constitutionally protected. At common law, a child born to a married
couple was presumed legitimate, and could not be declared otherwise without
independent proof that H was incapable of reproduction or had no access to W during
relevant period. Policies were to avoid
illegitimating children and to promote familial harmony. (id.)
a)
Lord Manfield’s Rule was that mother could not testify as to
non-access. Abolished in some states
14.
States might individually decide to give natural father of
child born to extant marriage some parental rights, but can prefer marital
father to exclusion of natural father (id.)
a)
Dissent in michael H. argues that if biological plus social
link can be shown, natural father should have constitutional rights
15.
Some states might equitable estop marital father from
disavowing parentage if he has raised child or assert parentage on his behalf
if he is innocent.
a)
UPA focuses on best interests of child
16.
If child is foreign-born, and mother is not U.S. citizen, then
father who is U.S. citizen must formally recognize child if child is to have
U.S. citizenship
IV. Marital Relationship
A.
Contract, Property, and Tort
1.
At common law, H and W were considered one, and the principal
of spousal unity prevented them from suing or contracting with each other. This principal has widely been rejected
today.
a)
Interspousal immunity seen as a way of preventing collusion;
b)
divorce was seen as adequate remedy.
2.
Contracts b/t H and W were seen as introducing unwelcome
elements into the marital relationship, such as separation of interests (Romeo)
3.
If common law rule is given any bite, it may only be applied
after analyzing the asserted justification of marital harmony against the
circumstances of the case (Romeo – worker’s compensation benefits to W does not
harm marriage, H is dead, policy against interspousal contracts makes no sense)
4.
Duty to support spouse runs to both parties.
a)
Creditors rely on necessities doctrine to collect on spouse’s
debts from the other
5.
Spouses have option of not testifying against partner.
a)
FRE allows one spouse to prevent introduction of confidential
communications
6.
Community property estates and common law marital estates look
similar upon division. Key difference
is that under common law, property interests are inchoate until marriage ends,
whereas community interests vest througout marriage in community property
scheme.
7.
Common law property rules (e.g. curtesy) were evaded by using
“wife’s separate estate in equity.”
8.
Denying forum to address wrongs might actually harm marital
relationship (Schleuter)
9.
Recovery in tort is separate property of injured spouse and
does not add to marital estate (id.)
10.
Community is not necessarily divided evenly upon divorce. Court must divide in “just and right”
manner, taking into consideration the rights of the parties as well as any children
of the marriage. (id.)
11.
A fraud upon the community may affect division, but does not
give rise to separate tort action (id. – H defrauded estate, could not be sued
for punitive damages, but only a judgment for recovery of lost community)
a)
Sufficiently outrageous conduct might give rise to a tort
claim
12.
Consortium can include society, companionship, and sexual
relations, but does no longer include earnings and services. Either spouse can sue third party for loss
of consortium. (Diaz)(in 48 states).
a)
Some states require that consortium claim be joined with
claims of other spouse
b)
Cohabitants cannot claim consortium
13.
Negligent conduct can result in loss of consortium that is
actionable (id.).
14.
Alienation of affections is a cause of action with the
following elements (can be brought even after couple has separated, can include
loss of financial support)(available in 9 states):
a)
Some wrongful conduct by D with P’s spouse
(1)
Could be mere counseling
b)
Loss of affection of P’s spouse
c)
Causal relation b/t D’s conduct and the loss (intent
requirment on D’s part)
15.
Action for criminal conversation only requires proof that D
had intercourse with P’s spouse.
B.
Family Violence
1.
Expert testimony on battered-women’s syndrome may be
admissible to establish honesty and reasonability of belief that D was in
imminent danger. (Cusseaux)
2.
A cause of action may be available for battered women’s
syndrome. Tort is treated as continuous.
Elements (id.)
a)
Involvement in marriage or marital-like relationship
b)
Physical or psychological abuse perpetrated by the dominant
partner over an extended period of time
c)
Aforestated abuse has caused recurring physical or
psychological injury over course of relationship
d)
Past or present inability to take any action to improve or
alter situation unilaterally.
3.
Burden of proof for a protective order varies from
state-to-state (e.g. Felton, requiring preponderance of evidence
4.
Options for domestic violence victim may include:
a)
Civil protection order
b)
No contact order
c)
Criminal complaint
d)
Divorce/custody suit
V. Divorce
A.
Grounds for Divorce
1.
When client enters, discussion should begin with no-fault
divorce rule, process, court appearances.
Things to explain include:
a)
property division
b)
alimony/maintenance
c)
custody/child support
2.
at common law, party had to be free of fault to bring an action
of divorce against spouse. Mutual
consent was not allowed.
3.
UMDA represents original “no fault” divorce rule (CB 681):
a)
marriage must be “irretrievably broken” – parties have lived
apart for one hundered and eighty days preceding suit or there is serious
marital discord adversely affecting their attitude towards marriage
b)
if one party denies marriage is irretrievably broken, court
may consider all relevant factors, and can continue case and order a
conciliation conference.
c)
33 states have such a rule. See I.C. 598.17
4.
Period of separation due to marital difficulties is strong
indicia of irretrievable breakdown. (Derochers)
5.
Whether differences are irreconcilable depends on subjective
state of mind of parties. Only one
spouse needs to demonstrate an unwillingness to continue relationship.
(id.)(Hagerty – W willing to go on but H would rather be an alcoholic)
6.
Chief concern is whether a meaningful marriage exists or can
be rehabilitated (Hagerty). This could
be shown by acknowledgement of both parties or by evidence presented by only
one party. (id.)
7.
Continuance is favored over denial where proof of breakdown is
doubtful, and dissolution should be granted if reconciliation fails (id.)
8.
Modern statutory test is whether marriage is for all intents
and purposes ended, regardless of cause or fault (id).
9.
Traditional grounds for divorce included:
a)
desertion: voluntary separation of one spouse from the other,
with intent not to resume marital cohabitation, without consent of the other
spouse, and without justification
(1)
also exists constructively if conduct is such as to force
other spouse to leave home
b)
cruelty
(1)
should be a course of conduct, not a single act unless
particularly extreme
(2)
must have effect on P’s health
(3)
is determined subjectively through traits of victim
c)
incompatibility: conflicts in personality and disposition so
deep as to make continuing a normal relationship impossible, as parties can no
longer live in harmony.
10.
Traditional defenses to divorce included:
a)
collusion – agreement b/t parties that one of them will not
defend suit or will appear to have committed an offense to the marriage
b)
connivance – plaintiff consents to commission of marital
offense
c)
condonation – resumption or continuance of marital
cohabitation so as to imply forgiveness
d)
recrimination – plaintiff has committed a marital offense (in
effect, this cancels defendant’s offense)
B.
Divorce jurisdiction
1.
Jurisdictional rules vary for each of the three categories of
divorce action (property, alimony, children)
2.
Domicile over one party is sufficient to grant a divorce
binding on other states, when done with constructive service on absent spouse
(Williams I).
a)
if state finds that domicile did not exist in other state,
recognition not required (Williams II)
3.
Party who appears in proceeding cannot thereafter challenge
domicile (Sherrer).
4.
After time, a former spouse may be estopped from challenging
the validity of a divorce.
5.
The more genuine the domicile, the stronger the validity of ex
parte divorce (e.g. party moves to state, gets job, ect.)
6.
For child support action, PJ depends on reas. Notice to D and
sufficient connection b/t D and forum state to make it fair to require defense
in the forum (Kulko – H had little contact w/ forum himself, so no PJ)
a)
Look to “quality and nature” of D’s activities in the state
b)
Look for “affiliating circumstances”
7.
Unilateral activity by relatives of D cannot establish minimum
contacts needed to adhere to traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. D must somehow purposefully
avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state. (id.)
8.
UIFSA permits P to file support claim in her state that can be
transferred for adjucication in D’s state.
It also permits jurisdiction on the following grounds:
a)
D has resided w/ child in state
b)
D resided in state an
provided prenatal expenses or support for child
c)
Child resides in state as a result of D’s actions
9.
Litigation over child custody requires PJ.
a)
Mere presence of property in the state is not enough.
(Shaffer)
10.
Participation in proceeding without objecting to jurisdiction
constitutes waiver, however any litigation on the jurisdictional issue is
binding on D.
11.
Judgment rendered w/o PJ may be challenged under Due Process
clause.
12.
Service of process within state is sufficient basis for PJ,
even w/o min. contacts.
13.
Legal incidences of marriage can survive ex parte divorce
(Estin – NV divorce does not relieve H of NY support obligation’ Vanderbilt –
even though no support judgment existed prior to divorce, NV cannot eliminate
marital right to bring an action for support)
a)
Maintanance is akin to property right, so ex parte state lacks
jurisdiction over it if it has no contacts with absent spouse.
b)
Divorce is thus “divisible” – parties treated as married for
some purposes and divorced for others
14.
Federal courts abstain from domestic relations cases, even
where diversity exists.
15.
So, ways to get jurisdiction can be summed up as follows:
a)
Personal service in state
b)
Consent
c)
Quasi in rem
d)
Long-arm
e)
Litigate in spouse’s home state
C.
Property Division
1.
Property must first be classified as marital or separate. See UMDA (CB 744)
a)
Marital – all property acquired during marriage except that
acquired by gift, devise, or descent; or excluded by agreement of the parties
(1)
When parties are separated and living apart, earnings are
separate property even in community property system (Short)
b)
In community property states, both spouses share interest at
moment property is acquired
(1)
But presumption that property is within community is rebuttable
(Short)
c)
“transmutation” is term to describe the changing of assets
from separate to marital or vice-versa
d)
Commingling can cause property to lose separate status. Tracing can avoid this result
e)
Wedding gifts can be separate property if intended to be for
one spouse only
2.
Much discretion is to given to the trial judge, but he must
provide clear reasons for findings and rulings (DeCastro)
3.
Marriage viewed as a partnership, in which both parties contribute to the development of the marital
estate (id.)
4.
Most cases result in equal division; some states require
so.
a)
Liabilities divided as well
5.
Most states make no connection b/t grounds for divorce and
financial remedies.
6.
Stock options are to be divided according to the time rule:
a)
Numerator is amount of time b/t commencement of employment and
date when parties separated
b)
Denominator is amount of time between commencement of
employment and date when each option is first exercisable;
c)
This fraction is multiplied by the number of shares which can
be purchased on the date when the option is first exercisable
d)
Unvested options granted during marriage for present services
are acquired when granted, but unvested options granted for future services are
acquired over time.
(1)
As for options that vest after separation, only the first one
is subject to division, since it results partly from community effort.
(2)
So for last year of marriage, divide married months by 12, then
multiply the result by the value of the options for the year.
7.
Property has to be valued for time received and time of
divorce
8.
Some states distinguish between active and passive increases
in value when figuring out how to divide appreciation (e.g. Middendorf –
stockyard appreciation due to H’s efforts, so part of appreciation belongs to
marital estate)
a)
This is standard rule for community property states – only active
increases count for community
b)
“source of funds rule” requires appreciation to be divided
into two categories for marital and separate, based on percentage of
appreciation attributed to active and passive contributions, respectively
9.
Once divorced, financial affairs of parties should be separated
from each other, so parties can move on (Bowen)
10.
If asset cannot be readily valued on market (i.e. close
corporation stock)
a)
To value a business, capitalize earnings by dividing annual
return by rate of return
(1)
Buy-sell agreement could be considered, but only if it takes
present circumtances into account (i.e. book value basis not good enough).
(2)
Good will must be incorporated
b)
Court should base opinion on factors supported in record,
demonstrated market reliability, or general acceptance.
c)
Some assets could be divided “in kind” by literally splitting
them down the middle (e.g. baseball card collection)
11.
Deferred compensation, such as pension benefits, are deferred
compensation acquired during marriage, and thus subject to division. Three possible methods of division (Kelm):
a)
Net present value – immediate distribution; offset against
other marital property
b)
Deferred distribution – time rule formula applied when
benefits are received (how ????)
(1)
Denominator should be variable in case payor spouse dies or
works past retirement age
c)
Reserve juridiction – court waits until benefits are actually
received then makes division
12.
“marital foundation” theory, not adopted by all states,
attributes enhancements in pension benefits occurring after divorce as a result
of marital activity and requires that enhancements be treated as community if
distribution is deferred (id.). ???
13.
Social security benefits are separate property.
14.
Disability payments could be viewed as substitute for wages
and therefor separate property.
15.
Goodwill of business enterprise is marital property, but
goodwill of individual is not divisible since it only represents future earning
capacity (Yoon – surgeon’s personal skills separate from business).
a)
To value personal goodwill, compare net income to industry
standard ratio of compensation to gross receipts
b)
Some courts don’t make this distinction and hold all goodwill
is marital property
16.
Academic degree is not divisible property, but maintenance may
be awarded with view to contributions of spouse to attainment of degree (Olar).
a)
Uncertain future course of action by degree holder makes
valuation difficult
b)
spouse’s contribution
to education could be taken into consideration in property division
c)
“reimbursement” can be made
D.
Spousal Support
1.
Maintanence should only be awarded if dependent spouse can
demonstrate inability to support self. Continuing support interferes with “clean
break.” Factors (Olar, see also
Larouque, UMDA):
a)
Financial resources
b)
Time needed to acquire education or training sufficient to find
appropriate employment;
(1)
Economic circumstances and reasonable expectations established
during marriage determine what is “appropriate”
c)
Standard of living established during marriage
d)
Duration of marriage
e)
Age and condition
f)
Ability to meet needs.
g)
Relative earning power.
2.
Unlike property, maintainance is nondischargable, modifiable,
tax deductible to payor, and terminates on death or remarriage
3.
When little property has accumulated during marriage,
maintanence may be only way to achieve equity.
4.
Maintenance has two objectives:
a)
Support – allow spouse to receive money in accordance with
needs and earning capacity of parties
(1)
Pre-divorce standards should be preserved, but both spouses
have to bear cost of additional household
(2)
Spouse should not be expected to sell marital property for
self-support
b)
Fairness – ensure fair and equitable financial arrangment
between parties
5.
Equal division of total income marks starting point for
analysis (Laroque).
6.
See I.C. 598.21
7.
Some states will consider marital misconduct when factoring
alimony awards.
8.
Limited-term support can be awarded for rehabilitative
purposes
9.
Payor spouse may be required to pay attorney fees to allow
dependent spouse to obtain alimony order.
10.
Changing circumstances can permit modification of alimony
order.
11.
Contractual maintenance can be a compromise to litigation, but
parties should be careful of unforseen circumstances (e.g. disability of payor)
a)
Such agreements are a way of avoiding discord and courts
should favor upholding them when fair, voluntary and knowledgably entered into (Konzelman-
agreement that support ends upon cohabitation upheld)
b)
Each party should have separate counsel
c)
Judicial review and approval must be had
d)
Court can oversee agreement to mitigate abuses (i.e. spying)
E.
Divorce Tax and Bankruptcy Issues (CB 834-39)
1.