Torts – Fall 1999, U of Iowa – Prof. Love

I.                     Strategic Considerations for Showing Intent

A.                  Punitive Damages -

1.                   Purpose

a)                   Knowledge, or

b)                  Transfer (Alteiri v. Colasso - Assault intended towards third party results in liability for battery when defendant is contacted in harmful way)

(1)                 Intent to offend can be transferred to harm when harm results. 
(2)                 Applies only to common law intentional torts

2.                   Recklessness, if subjective

a)                   Drunk driving may be considered malicious behavior subject to punitive damages (Cabe v. Lunich)

B.                  Bankruptcy

1.                   Purpose,

2.                   Knowledge, or

3.                   Transfer (Davis v. White - bystander shot instead of intended target may claim damages from a bankrupt defendant)

4.                   Damages resulting from injuries not intended to result from reckless medical malpractice are exempt from bankruptcy (Kawaahua v. Geiger)

C.                  Vicarious Liability

1.                   Purpose,

2.                   Knowledge? (Walker v. Kelly:  Parents not liable for actions of daughter who threw stone at boy because neither purpose or knowledge could be proven)

3.                   Reckless/Negligent acts tend not to apply to vicarious liablility for parents.

4.                   Vicarious Liability for employers

a)                   Tortfeasor in master/servant relationship w/employer and tort occurs w/i the scope of employment.

(1)                 “scope of employment” subject to wide interpretaion (e.g. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Mem. Hospital - hospital not liable for sexual assualt commited by worker administering ultrasound because his acts were not motivated by his job or the relationship it gave him with the victim).
(2)                 As a general rule, no vicarious liability exists for acts of independant contractors.  Exception is cases falling under non-delagable duty doctrine (work inherently dangerous. e.g, crop dusting)

b)                  Courts may generally do not want to make insurers out of employers.

c)                   Governments held liable for intentional torts of law-enforcement employees acting w/i scope of employment.

d)                  Direct liability for negligent hiring is an alternative to vicarious liablility.

D.                  Worker’s Compensation Exemption

1.                   Purpose.  It would be bizarre for employer to purposely injure an employee.

2.                   Knowledge, in some jurisdictions (Bercaw v. Dominos - employer not liable for death of employee delivering pizza to suspect location).  (Caudle v. Betts - Employer liable for unforeseeable injuries resulting from practical joke intended to harm or offend).

E.                  Liability Insurance

1.                   Intentional injuries usually not covered, except for transfered intent cases  (e.g. Grange Mutual v. Thomas - insurance company liable for shooting injuries inflicted by policyholder on bystander).

2.                   Many jurisdictions allow insurance to cover reckless acts.

3.                   Insurance will cover injuries which result from act intended to commit harm if those injuries cannot be within the scope of harm intended (Breland v. Schilling - severe injuries that could not have been foreseen by policyholder who attacked plaintiff were found to be a liability for the insurance company)

4.                   If an insured’s state of mind and knowledge of circumstances surrounding event in question has not been determined, then exemption for intentional injuries may not be applied until intent for injuries caused can be determined (Quincy Mutual v. Abernathy - insured threw large rock at car, court found injuries not necessarily intended)

II.                   Intentional Torts

A.                  Battery

1.                   Elements of Battery

a)                   Act by Defendant

b)                  Intended to cause harmful or offensive contact

(1)                 If harm is claimed, P does not have to be aware of harm at time of contact.
(2)                 If offense is claimed, P must know contact is offensive at time of contact.

c)                   cause in fact of harmful or offensive contact

d)                  (if seeking compensatory damages) cause in fact and proximate cause of injury to Plaintiff (difficult to prove)

e)                  Intent required for battery - some form of fault is required (Van Camp v. McAfoos - five year old child is not strictly liable for damages caused by tricycle crash into plaintiff)

B.                  Assault

1.                   Elements of Assault (to seek nominal + punitive damages)

a)                   Act by Defendant

b)                  Intended  (Purpose, Knowledge, or Transfer) to place plaintiff in apprehension of harmful or offensive contact

c)                   Cause in fact of apprehension of harmful or offensive contact

d)                  (if seeking compensatory damages) cause in fact and proximate cause of injury to plaintiff.

2.                   Apprehension on part of plaintiff an absolute must (McCraney v. Flanagan - plaintiff has no assualt claim if she cannot remember events)

3.                   Apprehension must be of imminent contact (Dickens v. Puryear - threat to kill plaintiff if he did not leave city was not an assault, but intentional infliction of emotional distress).

4.                   Grossly negligent or reckless actions do not provide sufficient intent (Gray v. Morley - defendant’s erratic driving which caused plaintiff to be thrown from truck was not subject to intentional tort liability)

C.                  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

1.                   Elements of IIED (to seek compensatory and nominal damages, or equitable injunction)

a)                   Act or ommission by D

b)                  Intent (Purpose, Knowledge, NOT transfer) to inflict emotional distress

c)                   Extreme and outrageous conduct (determined by culture of jurisdiction)

d)                  Cause in fact of severe emotional distress

(1)                 Distress must be such that a reasonable person could experience it given circumstances.

e)                  Family member who is present at time of act may also claim IIED (presence not required in kidnapping)

f)                     Non-family member who is present and receives bodily harm may also claim IIED.

2.                   Positional relationship of parties may provide cause of action for IIED even where conduct not otherwise extreme and outrageous (e.g. Swenson v. Northern Crop - employee able to sue for IIED resulting from sexism).  This may aid male plaintiffs.

3.                   “Egg Shell Plaintiff” - If D knows P is particuarly susceptible to emotional distress, otherwise unqualified behavior may become extreme and outrageous (e.g. LaBrier v. Anheuser Ford - Ds liable for distress of P who they knew had fragile emotional state).

D.                  Trespass to Land

1.                   Elements of Trespass to Land (for Nominal + Punitive damages).  Injury not necessary for punitive damages (e.g. Jaque v. Steenberg Homes - punitive damages used to deter trespass)

a)                   Act by D

b)                  Intent (Purpose, Knowledge, Transfer)- Intent only goes to entry upon land.  Mistake of ownership no excuse (52)

c)                   Cause in fact of interference of possession of real property.

d)                  (if seeking compensatory damages) Cause in fact and proximate cause of injury to P.

E.                  Trespass to Chattel

1.                   Elements of Trespass to Chattel (for nominal and punitive damages; equitable injunction)

a)                   Act by D

b)                  Intent (Knowledge, Purpose, Transfer)

c)                   Cause in fact of interference with possession of chattel.

d)                  (if seeking compensatory damages) cause in fact and proximate cause of injury to P.  Liability based on actual damage, not market value of chattel (56).

F.                  Conversion

1.                   Elements of Conversion (to recover compensatory & punitive damages)

a)                   Act by D

b)                  Intent (Purpose or Knowledge only).  Only knowledge of possession necessary.  Mistake as to ownership is no defense.

c)                   Cause in fact of substantial interference or appropration of personal property belonging to P.

2.                   Damages in conversion are measured as “forced sale”

III.                  Defenses to Intentional Torts

A.                  Justification Defenses

1.                   Defense of Property

a)                   Necessity must be actual

b)                  Reasonable (comparable) force

c)                   Force is limited - force causing death or serious bodily harm is not permitted

(1)                 Human life is valued over property (Katko v. Briney)
(2)                 After chattel is taken, peaceful means must be used to regain it.  “Hot pursuit” is only exception.

2.                   Violent Felony//Self Defense/Defense of Others

a)                   Necessity must be actual or apparent

b)                  Force must be reasonable (comparable to apparent necessity)

(1)                 Escalating force justified if agressor uses escalating force
(2)                 “Reasonable” judged by results.  i.e., Bad shots are penalized.

c)                   Unlimited force is permitted - including force causing death or serious bodily harm

d)                  Duty to retreat if not in home or workplace(“Castle” rule)

e)                  Court determines whether Felony was violent in each case.

f)                     Under common law, defense of another was subject to liablility if in fact the other would not have been justified in using the amount of force used themselves.  Modern law allows defender to use force that defender believed necessary.

3.                   Arrest (DH 67)

a)                   Police officer may make arrest under “probable cause” that felony has been committed.

b)                  Private person who is mistaken as to existence of a misdemeanor has no defense (e.g. Great Atlantic v. Paul - store liable for false arrest of suspected shoplifter), but mistake of felony may be a defense.

B.                  Consent (Exampled by medical cases)

1.                   Types of Consent

a)                   Express - written or spoken (bars recovery)

b)                  Implied in fact - illicited by actions (bars recovery)

c)                   Implied by law (bars recovery)

2.                   Scope

a)                   Surgeon permitted to remedy unanticipated situations w/i area of incision (Kennedy v. Parrot)

3.                   Elements that can void consent

a)                   Incompetency

(1)                 “Mature minor” might make competent decision
(2)                 “Substituted Consent” allows family/friend to stand in for patient that is unable to give consent.

b)                  Fraud/Duress

(1)                 If patient agrees to surgery under false diagnosis, physician liable for battery (Cacdac v. West).

c)                   Illegal act by defendant

d)                  Against public policy

C.                  Necessity

1.                   Public necessity

a)                   Government usually does not have to pay for damage to private property owners resulting from necessity.

b)                  If Gov. is liable, necessity provides a partial defense.  Compensatory, but not punitive or nominal, damages may be awarded.

2.                   Private necessity

a)                   Lack of necessity precludes defense.

b)                  Must be case of harm to property

c)                   Force used must be reasonable

d)                  Compensatory damages must be paid to property owner (Vincent v. Lake Erie).

e)                  If property owner acts to end trespass that occured out of necessity, property owner is liable for damages sustained by trespassor (Ploof v. Putnam).

D.                  Statute of Limitations

E.                  Immunities

IV.                Recklessness

A.                  Elements of Recklessness (to recover compensatory and punitive damages [punitive applies to subjective recklessness])

1.                   Act by defendant

2.                   Reckless act (subjective or objective)

3.                   Duty of care

4.                   Breach of Duty

a)                   D knew (subjective) or should have known (objective) of high risk of harm

b)                  D’s conduct highly unreasonable

5.                   Cause in fact & proximate cause of harm to P

B.                  Defenses to Recklessness

1.                   Assumption of risk

2.                   Contributary recklessness

3.                   Statute of Limitations

4.                   Immunities

V.                  Negligence

A.                  Elements of Negligence (to recover compensatory damages)

1.                   Act by D

2.                   Negligent act (subjective or objective)

3.                   Duty of Care (applies to recklessness as well)

a)                   Reasonable Person Standard

b)                  Judicial Rule (e.g. Helling v. Carey - Despite custom, opthamology patients under 40 should have glaucoma test administered)

c)                   Legislation (negligence per se)

(1)                 Two types:
(a)                 Civil (e.g. Scovill v. Hubbard - Officials liable for not confining drunk when they had a statutory duty to do so.
(b)                Criminal

(i)                   Violation might result in negligence per se (e.g. Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter - adult liable for allowing minor to operate vehicle), but

(ii)                 It might not (e.g. Carter v. William Sommerville & Son - application of statute too far removed from activity causing injury)

(2)                 Test for finding negligence per se (see Wright v. Brown):
(a)                 Person injured belongs to class of persons that statute meant to protect
(b)                Injury is of the sort that statute was meant to prevent
(3)                 Comments
(a)                 If party violates statute but does so because adhering to statute would result in greater danger than violation, then party is not negligent per se (e.g. Tedla v. Ellman - Scavengers walked along highway with traffic because doing so was safer)
(b)                Child standard of care applies to children in negligence per se (Rudes v. Gottschalk)
(c)                 Violation of an administrative rule, as opposed to a statute, is not negligence per se (Chambers v. St. Mary’s School)

4.                   Breach of duty

a)                   D should have known risk of harm (Trial Court)

b)                  D’s conduct unreasonable.  Test for finding conduct unreasonable:

(1)                 Trial Court:  Was magnitude of risk greater than utiltiy of D’s conduct?  Compare Washington v. Louisiana Power & Light (power company not responsible for death resulting from contact w/ uninsulated power line) to Dobson v. Louisiana Power and Light (power company partially liable)
(2)                 Jury:  Did D do what a reasonable ______ person would have done under the ______ circumstances?

5.                   Cause in fact and proximate cause of harm to P

B.                  Defenses to Negligence

1.                   Assumption of Risk

2.                   Contributory negligence.

a)                   Bars recovery (common law)

b)                  Comarative fault

(1)                 Bars recovery
(2)                 Reduces recovery

C.                  Sudden Emergency Doctrine

1.                   The use of a jury instruction regarding sudden emergency must be short and non-predudicial.

2.                   D must be entitled to instruction (e.g. Weiss v. Bal - Judge erred in giving instruction because D should have been prepared for situation that occured)

D.                  Disabilities

1.                   Disabled persons held to a generic “reasonable person” standard may end up strictly liable for reckless/negligence.

2.                   Disabled persons are not required to exercise a higher degree of care than enabled persons (Shepard v. Gardener)

3.                   Reasonable care is expected from disabled persons, but public must reasonably allow for disability (Roberts v. State of Louisiana - Blind man not liable for failure to use cane on routine trip to bathroom)

E.                  Minors

1.                   General Rule:  A child sued for negligence is held to the standard of care of a reasonably careful child of the same age, intelligence, and experience.

2.                   When children engage in dangerous activities more suitable for adults, they are held to an adult standard of care (Robinson v. Lindsay - young child responsible for injuries incurred by passanger on snow mobile)

F.                  Custom

1.                   A party that unreasonably fails to take measures that would have prevented loss is liable even if such measures are not in popular use. (The T.J. Hooper)

2.                   General custom might dictate ordinary standard of care (e.g. Duncan v. Corbetta - D used mininum grade of wood required by code but nonetheless found liable for P’s injuries because higher grade of wood was customary)

G.                 Evidence of Negligence

1.                   Without evidence of fault, no action for negligence can be brought (Gift v. Palmer - D motorist runs over child w/o witnesses or other evidence of fault, not liable).

2.                   Proof of breach required:

a)                   Direct

b)                  Circumstantial

(1)                 Non - res ispa loquitor
(a)                 Jury decision
(b)                Nonsuit/directed verdict for D
(2)                 Res Ispa Loquitor - Negligence infered (most jurisdictions) or presumed on facts of case.  If presumed, burden of proof is on defendant to negate negligence.  Requirments (Valley Properties v. Steadman’s Hardware):
(a)                 Event does not ordinarily occur in abscence of negligence
(b)                Other responsible causes sufficiently eliminated by evidence; and
(c)                 indicated negligence w/i scope of D’s duty to P.

3.                   Cause-in-fact (mutually exclusive tests)

a)                   But-for test - Harm would not have occurred w/o D’s negligent act

b)                  Substantial Factor test - If D’s negligent act contributed to the damage, D is liable, even if separate event would have caused damage anyway (e.g. Anderson v. Minn, St. Paul Railway - Fire caused by D joined another fire and P’s property was destroyed.  D held liable)

4.                   Proximate Cause (very indeterminable in close cases)

a)                   Forsight Test - Duty is not owed where risk cannot be perceived. 

(1)                 If D acts negligently towards another, and as a result of such behavior a third party is injured in an unforeseeable manner, D is not liable for injury to third party (Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad)
(2)                 Injuries which are foreseeable, but which occur in unforseeable manner, may or may not be accountable to D (compare Hugh v. Lords Advocate w/ Doughty v. Turner)
(3)                 D is liable for unforeseeable consequences of forseeable injury (Hammerstein v. Jean Development; Smith v. Hardy)

b)                  Direct consequences test - Intervening force supercedes D’s action.  Court determines whether force supercedes.

(1)                 Intervening act must occur after, not before, D’s act.
(2)                  If D’s negligence enables third party to injure P, D is not liable if third party’s  behavior could not have been anticipated (Watson v. Kent. and Ind. Railway)
(3)                 D liable for injuries in “thin skull” cases, in respect to physical harm/property damage that is beyond what D should have ordinarily foreseen in given circumstances .

c)                   Policy test - Should D be held liable as a matter of public policy?

(1)                 P charged with caring for violent but mentally incompetent D in appropritate facility cannot recover for injuries resulting from D’s violent behavior (Anicet v. Gant, ect.).
(2)                 Intentional tort actions may be brought against mentally disabled.

VI.                Defenses to Negligence and Recklessness

A.                  Contributory Negligence:  suggests that P’s act superceded D’s act to render  injury indirect consequence of D’s act.

1.                   At common law, a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions.  (Butterfield v. Forrester - if P is injured due to his own failure to exercise due caution, combined w/ negligent act of D, P may not recover from D)  Exception was last-clear-chance doctrine:  If D had final opportunity to prevent injury, P was not barred from recovery.

2.                   In comparative fault jurisdictions, contributary negligence reduces recovery

a)                   Pure comparative fault - recovery is not barred, but is exactly proportional to fault.

b)                  Modified comparative fault - recovery reduced by percentage of P’s fault up to a particular percentage (usually 50% or 51%).  Recovery barred if P contributed more than such percentage.

3.                   Determining comparative fault

a)                   Last-clear-chance doctrine may be used as factor for determining comparative negligence, but not as total relief of P’s liability (Spawn v. Town of Port Royal)

b)                  Con. Neg. may be determined using objective reasonable person standard (Brittain v. Booth)

c)                   Cost of avoiding injury to P should be matched against cost of avoiding injury to D (Wassel v. Adams)

4.                   Bars on assessing contributary negligence (P incompetent or unable to protect self)

a)                   Bexiga Doctrine:  If D had a duty to prevent an injury of such a sort that it would probably arise from negligence on the part of P, then D may not claim con. neg. (e.g. punch press cases).  If

b)                  D employed to prevent P from hurting himself cannot claim con. neg. (McNamara v. Honeyman)

5.                   Other rules concerning Con. Neg.

a)                   P has duty to minimize damages

b)                  Res Ispa Loquitur cases require proof of only first two elements

c)                   D’s willfull, but not intentional, actions vary in degree, but not in kind, of negligence.  Thus, recklessness actions are subject to con. neg. in comparitive fault jurisdictions

d)                  Con. Neg. does not reduce punitive damages (Gobersen v. Miller)

B.                  Contributory Recklessness

C.                  Assumption of the Risk

1.                   Types/elements

a)                   Express (Bars recovery)

b)                  Implied (reduces recovery)

(1)                 P knew of risk
(2)                 P voluntarily assumed risk

c)                   Scope

d)                  Void

(1)                 <