Conflict of
Laws – Spring 2001, U of Iowa – Prof. Bohannon
I.
Traditional Approach to Choice of Law
A.
Introduction
1.
Territoriality is
important. Sovereign state must have
the power to govern people and events within its own state.
2.
Issues
a)
Fairness
to D
b)
Predictibility
3.
Reasons for applying
foreign law
a)
Comity
– states respect each other’s rights to govern events within themselves
b)
Vested
rights – plaintiffs can expect claims to hold water
c)
Local
law theory – rights don’t exist until a court makes them. So we must ask “what would the foreign court
do?”
B.
Single-Aspect Rules
1.
In a tort action, the
applicable substantive law is that of the jurisdiction where the event
inflicting the injury itself occurs, not where the acts took place (Carroll –
negligent acts took place in Alabama but injury occurred in Mississippi, so
Mississippi law applies).
a)
There
are exceptions to this general rule.
i.e., toxic torts
b)
Restatement
applies standard of care for state where act took place and prohibits liability
for actors whose acts are justified under the law of the state where the act
took place, even if injuries occur elsewhere (CB 15)
2.
In contract cases, the
law of the “place of contracting” controls.
a)
Place
of contracting determined by finding out where last act that bound parties
occurred (Milliken).
b)
Restatement
uses “principle event” test (CB 20-21).
Forum might apply general contracting principles rather than its own
specific law ?????
c)
Parties
need to be sure of what law applies to K
d)
Forum
law determines the place of contracting
e)
Place
of performance will govern the performance, so long as it doesn’t affect
substance of K (CB 25).
3.
For property disputes
a)
Law
of the decedent’s domicile will govern matters concerning succession of movable
goods
(1)
Everyone has one and only one domcile, determined by
(a)
Actual prescence, which is absolutely
necessary (White)
(b)
Intent to remain indefinetely
(2)
Last domicile remains domicile until new one is established
b)
Situs
at time of transfer will determine law governing movable goods for inter vivos
transfer
c)
Law
of Situs applies to immobile property (Barrie’s Estate – will no good in
Illinois but land affected is in Iowa where will provision is valid so
testators disposition is given effect).
C.
Characterization
1.
Categorizing case
affects choice of law (e.g., K, tort, property).
2.
A statute might change
the characterization of a case (i.e. Levy, liability clause in rental agreement
converted negligence case to contract case)
3.
Ask if the reason for
a foreign statute would be furthered by applying it to the case (i.e.
Haumschild – Wisc. Decided that since CA law limiting capacity to sue husband
served only CA policy of protecting families, suit could be allowed in Wisc.).
4.
Place of injury does
not necessarily control capacity to sue/be sued (Id.).
D.
Substance v. Procedure
1.
Law should be
characterized as substantive or procedural with an eye toward the purpose of
the characterization (Grant).
2.
Purely administrative
matters should be handled by forum law.
Id.
3.
Remedy is a procedural
matter (CB 52). Public policy of forum must be considered
4.
Beale felt that if
adopting foreign law was of no great inconvenience to forum and the effect on
the rights of the parties was great, foreign law should be used. Id.
5.
If a foreign statute
of limitations simply bars the remedy, then forum can apply its own
statute. But if foreign right of action
is actually conditioned on time, then foreign statute must be applied to bar
action. Test is whether limitation was
directed at the right specifically as a qualification (Bournias).
6.
If law has to be
pleaded, it is more likely to be substantive.
7.
Look to whether foreign
jurisdiction considers its law substantive or procedural
8.
Examine substantive
goals of foreign law that may be procedural.
E.
Renvoi
1.
Court should seek to
effect analysis that would consistent with foreign proceedings (Schnieder –
foreign rights in land would be controlled by domicile law due to foreign
choice-of-law rules, so forum should apply domicile law)
2.
One “loop” may be made
to show deference to foreign choice-of-law rules.
3.
Beale felt that
foreign law’s only purpose was to vest rights, not to control choice-of-law. Cook and Lorenzen felt that forum should
apply foreign choice rule if it dictated important rights.
4.
A “remission” is a
referral back to the law of the forum; A “transmission” in a referral to the
law of a third state.
F.
Proving Foreign Law
1.
Burden is on P to
plead and prove foreign law, which is treated as a fact (Walton). Ct. cannot be burdened with determining
foreign law.
2.
Alternatives to
treating foreign law as fact include
a)
Taking
judicial notice
b)
Assuming
foreign law is same as forums
c)
Certifying
question to foreign court.
3.
If foreign state has
no law on point or law that is inadequate, forum might choose law of state that
has closest connection to the case (Walton).
G.
Public Policy Escape/Penal Laws/Tax Laws
1.
If right of action is
forbidden in forum by public policy, it may be rejected (Loucks).
2.
Generally, rights of
action are “transitory” as they resemble a property right that can be asserted
anywhere. Id.
3.
A mere difference in
remedy will not bar a foreign law from applying (Id. – although Mass. allowed
greater damages than NY, NY applied Mass. law since it was not inconsistent w/
NY policy).
4.
Similarity test is
rejected but remains helpful to P in the even laws are comparable.
5.
Exceptional
circumstances should exist to invoke the public policy exception, and it would
be best to dismiss case w/o prejudice so another forum can try it.
6.
Public Policy is
embodied in law, not morality (Mertz)
7.
If case is
recharacterized due to territoriality, public policy could end up dispositing
of a case w/ predjudice (i.e. Mertz) ????
8.
Using foreign law for
a defense is less likely to invoke public policy exception (CB 77) (e.g. Holzer
– Norembourg laws created an illegality defense on K, which was upheld).
9.
Courts generally
should not accept cases dealing with foreign penal laws, due to foreign states
interest in enforcement of those laws.
a)
Statute
is penal if it awards penalty to state, either directly or through member of
the public (CB 79-80). Does this
include puntive damages ?????
b)
For
a law to get maximum enforcement, it should not be penal
10.
Courts will not
enforce foreign tax laws (CB 82-83).
II.
Modern Approaches to Choice of Law
A.
Public or Private Specification
1.
UCC –
a)
If
Parties include a COL clause in K, it is valid if
(1)
Law chosen bears reas. Relation to K, and
(2)
There’s no contrary UCC provision
b)
Forum
law applies if there’s an “appropriate relation” to the K.
c)
If
no appropriate relation, default to traditional rules.
2.
Borrowing statutes
direct forum to dismiss claims under foreign statutes of limitation in
appropriate circumstances
a)
SOL
is carried in w/ substantive law
b)
Tolling
statutes also incorporated
c)
Shorter
SOL usually chosen.
3.
Parties agree to
contract in view of a particular states law. Default rule is place of K.
a)
Presumption
of place of K rebuttable (Pritchard)
b)
Parties
will not be presumed to have entered into an invalid K. (Pritchard).
4.
If parties designate
applicable law, it must
a)
Be
a bona fide choice
b)
Be
of a place that has some relation to the agreement.
B.
Choice of law clauses in Contracts
1.
General presumption is
that place of performance will govern K. (CB 102-03).
2.
Restatement (Second)
§187(1) allows incorporation by reference of things that could have been dealt
w/ by incorporation (e.g., definitional terms).
3.
Restatement (Second)
§187(2) deals with validity issues. Renvoi
is rejected. Choice allowed unless:
a)
There
is no substantial relationship or reas. Basis for the choice
(1)
If conditions are such that there is uncertainty, law
should not be chosen
b)
Choice
violates “fundamental” public policy of a state w/ greater interest than chosen
state or default state
4.
Restatement (Second)
§188 makes default law that of state w/ most significant relationship to
parties and transaction.
5.
Removal of property to
a state may indicate intent to have that states laws govern (Wyatt).
6.
UCC does not expressly
provide for public policy exception
7.
UCC requires reas.
Relationship for matters of interpretation
C.
The Second Restatement (Intro)
1.
Second Restatement is
the most widely adopted choice-of-law approach. General two-step approach
a)
Choose
presumtively applicable law under appropriate jurisdiction-selection rule; and
b)
Test
this choice against §6 principles.
2.
§6 lays out the
presumptive rules:
a)
statutory
directive of forum will be followed
b)
If
no directive, then consider (these factors not exclusive, and should be weighed
in light of the given problem)
(1)
Needs of interstate/international system
(2)
Relevent forum policies
(3)
Relative policies and issues pertaining to other states
(4)
Protection of justified expectations
(5)
Basic policies underlying particular field of law
(6)
Certainty, predictibility, uniformity of result
(7)
Ease of determining and applying the law
3.
§145 explains the
factors that determine choice of law in tort cases
4.
§§ 186 and 188
determine choice of law in contract cases
5.
The nature of an
interest may determine its weight (Woods Bros.)
6.
Each issue should be
determined according to the law of the state with which it has the most
significant relationship (Id.).
7.
Presumption in K cases
is that place of performance will govern, but another state w/ a more
significant relationship can trump. (Id.)
8.
When a state has a
statute addressing issue and another state doesn’t, that may indicate that
statutory state has a greater interest (e.g. Id.- NM had statute to protect
against faulty contruction, CO only had common law K rights).
9.
Significance of
contacts determined by quality, not quantity.
Factors to weigh:
a)
Strength
of each state’s interest
(1)
Specificity
(2)
Nature
(3)
Statute v. common law
(4)
Criminal v. Civil law
b)
relevance
these interests to present case
D.
Interest Analysis
1.
Purpose, not words, of
legislation should be looked to (Marek).
a)
Ascertain
purpose that led to adoption of law for wholly domestic cases
b)
Determine
which contacts bring a multistate case within that purpose
2.
True conflict exists
where the combination of both a policy and a relevant contact can be found in
multiple states
3.
False conflicts should
be weeded out so that states w/ true interest can govern.
4.
Interest analysis is
meant to take place prior to 2nd
restatement analysis ?????
E.
False Conflcts
1.
Guest statute cases
frequently illustrate interest analysis.
When both driver and passenger are from out of state, a guest statute
existing in the place of injury will not govern (e.g. Tooker).
2.
Distinction should be
made between conduct-regulating laws (in which lex loci has an interest) and
loss-allocating laws (lex loci has no interest if P & D are both
foreigners) (Shultz – NY’s lack of charitable immunity not implicated when
abuser and victim came from New Jersey for weekend trip, on theory that the law
was intended to spread loss, not impede abuse).
a)
When
both parties are domiciled in same state, loss allocation is relevent only to
that state
3.
Fairness of applying a
law outside the lex loci must be taken into consideration (Tooker – issue
whether D’s behavior was patterned by reliance on local law).
4.
When law deals only
with remedy and not whether conduct itself is unlawful, reliance on lex loci
law is less likely (shultz).
5.
Issues arise over
whether courts have capacity to interpret what the policies behind laws are.
6.
An “unprovided-for”
case is one in which neither state has an interest (policy+contact).
a)
5
approaches
(1)
Default rule is to use forum law
(2)
Allow judge discretion to apply better law
(3)
Apply law that aids local resident
(4)
Treat foreign claiments as they would be treated in their
home states.
(5)
Search for common policy
b)
Look
at all relevent state laws to see if there’s a hidden interest
F.
True Conflicts
1.
Public policy may
permit a court to apply forum law even when foreign interests are stronger
(Lillienthal)
2.
When interests are
equally compelling, apply forum law when forum is one of the interested states
(Id. – spendthrift law protects D from California K).
3.
Courts should restrain
interpretation of local interests.
4.
Expectations of
parties likely to be upheld in contract cases (e.g. Bernkrant – oral K good in
NV will not be invalidated by CA statute of frauds where one party had no
reason to know other was a CA resident, and K was made in NV concerning NV
realty).
5.
Relative strength of
conflicting policies should be taken into account (e.g. Id. – reas.
Expectations vs. statute of frauds)
G.
Comparative Impairment
1.
Only CA has adopted
comparative impairment
2.
Forum should restrain
interpretation - see whether it has a
“real” interest as compaired to a hypothetical interest (see Bernhard)
3.
Law of state whose
interest would be more impaired by nonapplication of its law should receive
deference. Interests are not weighed
against each other (e.g. Id. – CA could not reasonably effectuate its policy
against serving alcohol to drivers if neighboring states allow such service; NV
policy in protecting defendants not so frustrated).
4.
Pertinence of state
interest measured by how much interest is furthered/impaired by
application/nonapplication
5.
Substance should
prevail over procedure
6.
Two branches of
comparative impairment:
a)
Theoretical
(1)
Conduct regulation, e.g. 1953 Ford, Bernkrant
(2)
Modern restrained interpretation
(3)
Attempt to meet common policy, perhaps
b)
Practical
(1)
Loss-allocating, eg. Bernhard Schultz
H.
Principles of Preference
1.
Cavers principles
a)
The
law of the place of injury should apply if more protective of P than law of
place where D resides or acted; if not
b)
The
law of the state where D acted and caused injury should apply if less
protective of P than law of P’s home state
2.
In conduct-regulating
cases, law of jurisdiction where tort occurred has greatest interest; if
remedial rules are being decided, parties domiciles are the chief factors
(Cooney)
3.
Neumeier rules address
loss-allocation (Cooney):
a)
Common
domicile requires domocile law to apply
b)
When
domicile is not shared, and lex loci is P’s domicile, that law applies. If lex loci is in D’s domicile, law of D’s
state applies.
c)
If
injury occurs in state where neither party is domiciled, lex loci applies.
4.
Public policy only
applied when applicable substantive law is not forum law and local nexus with
case is strong enough to threaten public policy (Id.).
I.
Better Law
1.
Leflar summarized the
5 considerations as follows (in rank order)
a)
Predictability
of results
(1)
Dispositive in K cases
b)
Maintanance
of interstate & international order
(1)
This is maintained if forum applies its own law having
significant contacts with the case (Milkovich)
(2)
Not implicated in a false conflict
c)
Simplification
of the judicial task
d)
Advancement
of the forums governmental interest
(1)
Tied to “better law” factor
e)
Application
of the better rule of law
(1)
“Better law” is one which best reflects reason and justice
(Milkovich)
2.
First 3 principles
more applicable to contract cases than to torts.
3.
Question of substance
v. procedure leans towards choosing procedure
4.
Obsolete laws are
“worse” than modern laws (e.g. Id. – guest statute ill serves modern age of car
pooling)
5.
Rationales of laws
must be taken into account
J.
Depecage and Renvoi revisited
1.
Depecage is the
concept of applying different laws to different issues.
a)
Currie
believed that uncontemplated results should not result (e.g. Adams – P would
have no cause of action if negligance and immunity laws of one state governed,
but can create one by mixing and matching between states)
b)
Legislatures
don’t seem to consider multistate cases.
c)
If
laws are obviously meant to go together, depecage is inappropriate
2.
Renvoi question
dissappears in interest analysis according to most commentators
a)
Foreign
choice of law rules still useful in resolving difficult cases
b)
Some
argue that foreign choice-of-law rules reflect foreign state’s policy and
should be considered
c)
May
helpful to reveal “true intent” in a false conflict case
III.
Constitutional Aspects of Choice of Law
A.
Due Process
1.
To the extent that the
law interferes w/ the rights of out-of-staters to be treated like state
citizens, there is a federal due process issue
2.
State “procedural”
laws can be challenged as a violation of substantive due process (Dick - remedy not shielded from due process
analysis)
3.
Unfair surprise is an
important factor (id. – parties contracted for one-year period of limitation,
TX statute could not supercede since K was not made or to be performed in TX).
4.
Forum cannot abrogate
rights of parties whose activities are unrelated to the forum (id.).(quid pro
quo – if D not benefited by state, D should not be burdened by state).
5.
Place of making K
probably more important than place of performance, since forum cannot modify
rights and obligations through its own statutes even when a party to K resides
in forum (Hartford Acc. – slight connection not enough to invoke forum policy
limiting time within which to file claim).
B.
Full Faith & Credit
1.
A forum may consider
its own policies in denying rights created by foreign law, but must recognize
those rights if its own policy is not seriously compromised (Clapper –
substantive defense to worker’s compensation act could not be denied where only
forum contact was place of injury and law was loss-allocating).
2.
Place of K is
apparently a good enough contact to warrant an application of forum law (Alaska
Packers – place of performance and place of injury in AK, but K was made in CA
so CA can apply its Worker’s compensation statue over AK exclusive remedy
rule), as is place of injury (Pacific Employers)
3.
Applicablity of forum
law may be presumed, and challenger assumes burden of showing that foreign
interests are so superior that they must be honored (Id.).
4.
Even if a foreign
statute would control in a foreign court, forum is not compelled to apply
foreign statute where its own policy is applicable to persons and events within
forum (Pacific Employers)
5.
Keep in mind that a
sufficient “interest” to warrant application of forum law is not
necessarily the same type of “interest”
needed for interest analysis.
C.
Convergence of Due Process with Full Faith & Credit
1.
If a state has only an
insignificant contact with the parties and the occurance/transaction,
application of its law is unconstitutional (Allstate, citing Dick, Yates).
2.
Test for whether
application of a states law is constitutional is whether state has a significant
contact or a significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary or fundamentally unfair
(unfair surprise remains a separate test???.
Dispute between plurality/concurrance, perhaps). (Allstate - place of employment, business conducted
there by D, P moved there after event occurred).
a)
Expectation
of parties an important factor
3.
Administrative
interests are not alone sufficient to justify application of forum law
(Allstate, Stevens, concurring) (Shutts).
4.
Application of law
that is fair as to some claims of a class-action suit may not be fair as to
other claims (Shutts – oil leases that did not involve KS land or KS investors
wouldn’t be governed by KS law, even though D did business in KS).
5.
Jurisdiction over a
claim is not a factor to be weighed in considering forum interest (Shutts)
(does this mean administration not a factor??).
6.
Blanket rule
prohibiting courts from entertaining certain types of suits is unconstitional
(Hughes – WI cannot summarily refuse to hear wrongful death suits when all
events occurred out-of-state).
a)
Policy
of FF&C clause has to be weighed against forum policy in each case
b)
If
a court has jurisdiction over a suit, it must enforce those claims protected by
the FF&C clause (Broderick, CB 301)?????
7.
In summary, a state may not discriminate
against foreign law unless
a)
It
has a sufficient justification, and
b)
Tailors
that discrimination to fit the justification (CB 303).
8.
Interest analysis
still constitutional where fundamental rights are not involved
D.
Priviledges and Immunities
1.
Residents and
non-residents may not be treated unequally if to do so would infringe on
privleges and immunities that bear “on the vitality of the nation as a single
entity” (Piper – nonresident has a right to practice law in NH), unless
a)
There
is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment, and
b)
The
discrimination has a substantial relationship to the objective.
2.
If P&I clause
won’t work, try EP clause (CB 317-18).
IV. Recognition of Judgments
A.
Recognition of Judgments
1.
Claim preclusion
precludes further suits upon the same cause of action after a final
judgment. The original claim is said to
be “barred” by a judgment for the defendant and “merged” in one for the
plaintiff.
2.
Issue preclusion deals
with situations in which issues determined in previous litigation were:
a)
Litigated
by the parties
b)
Determined
by the tribunal
c)
Necessarily
so determined
3.
Issues actually
decided will be forclosed by “direct estoppel” if judgment was not issued “on
the merits.”
4.
Collateral estoppel
gives preclusive effect to essential findings necessarily determined in an
earlier litigation in a subsequent litigation on another cause of action
between the same parties.
5.
Common tests for
defining the scope of a “claim” or “cause of action can be used:
a)
Same
principles of substantive/procedural law are applicable to both actions
b)
Same
right is alleged to be infringed by the same wrong
c)
Judgment
sought in second action would infringe rights established in first
d)
Same
evidence would support both actions
e)
Operative
facts same in both actions
6.
Mutuality is no longer
required in many courts, so a plaintiff in a new action can use a determination
made in a previous action to which P
was not a party, even though P would not have been bound by a contrary finding.
7.
Full Faith and Credit
must be given to out-of-state judgments under the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. 1728 applies this requirement to
the federal courts re state judgments, and to the state courts re federal
judgments (CB 406-07).
8.
Actions must be allowed
on valid foreign judgments
a)
“the
judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect in
every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was
pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such
State, and none others, could be pleaded in any other court of the United
States.” (Faunterloy, citing Hampton).
9.
Even an out-of-state
judgment that was rendered due to a mistaken application of local law must be
enforced by the forum (Faunterloy – even though MS would not allow action on
gambling debt, MO mistakenly did so, MS must enforce judgment).
10.
Degree of effect given
to foreign judgment must be the same as that given to by rendering court
(Yarborough – GA child alimony decree cannot be modified by subsequent SC
decree, since GA decree fixed amt. owed).
a)
Federal
courts apparently must give same preclusive effect to lower ct. judgments???
b)
Restatement
suggests that in cases of extreme public policy violation, recognition need not
be given to foreign judgments where local interests are primarily
concerned. But this is probably not
allowable.
c)
Decree
that is modifiable in rendering state can be modified by forum if rendering
state would have done so (Kovacs – custody changed by N.C. ct. where NY made
original decree).
B.
Challenging Jurisdiction
1.
States may determine
extraterritorial effect of their own judgments only by prescribing the effect
of its judgments within its own borders (Thomas, dissaproving of McMartin rule
allowing states to explicitly state the extraterritorial effect).
2.
Decsion by state
administrative agency, as opposed to a court of general jurisdiction, is not
necessarily entitled to the same res judicata effect that a true judgment would
get, but factfindings are binding (Thomas – DC allowed to supplement worker’s
compensation award granted in VA, since DC could have been first forum anyway).
(Thomas was a plurality opinion).
a)
Administrative
awards and orders today are treated just like judgments from courts of general
jurisdiction.
3.
Jurisdiction of
original forum cannot be questioned when jurisdictional issues where fully and
fairly litigated there (Durfee – quiet title action in NE cannot be subsumed by
subsequent action in MO despite uncertainty of where land is located, since
that issue was addressed by NE courts).
Under the Restatement, this rule applies unless the policy of res
judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting a state to act outside
its jurisdiction. Factors include:
a)
Lack
of SMJ
b)
Jurisdiction
dependent on question of law rather than of fact
c)
Original
court was of limited and not general jurisdiction
d)
Question
of jurisdiction was not actually litigated
e)
Policy
against court’s acting outside of jurisdiction is strong.
4.
A party who objects to
personal jurisdiction must say so immediately if he appears or he must not
appear at all. If he has full and fair
opportunity to challenge jurisdiction, he is barred from doing so in a
collateral attack should he fail to take advantage of that opportunity
(Chicot).
5.
If P fraudulently
encourages D not to appear, second forum needn’t treat first forum’s default
judgment as binding (of course, if forum lacked PJ over D, judgment wouldn’t be
binding anyway).
C.
Land and Equitable Decrees
1.
Only the law of the
state where land is located may determine its disposition under testate or
intestate succession (Clark – S.C. judgment converting CT land to personalty
invalid; CT decides disposition).
2.
Although state where
land is not located cannot affect title in the land, it may enforce its order to
an individual to convey the land (Fall – WA cannot quiet title to NE land, but
can hold owner in contempt and otherwise enforce K rights re NE land). (also,
action on judgment could be taken in NE).
3.
State may not have
option of recognizing foreign decree over local land due to due process clause
(CB 449).
4.
If a equitable decree
is modifiable, then local court may modify it if rendering court could have
(Worthley)
a)
If
rendering court’s judgment is retroactively modifiable, then liquidated sum is
entitled to full faith and credit.
b)
If
judgment is prospectively modifiable, it receives full faith and credit so long
as circumstances haven’t changed
D.
State & Federal Recognition
1.
Even though a
particular judgment could not have been obtained in the forum, the forum must
recognize it if it was valid in the rendering state (Lamb – MO must recognize
judgment revived in CO, even though judgment was too old to revive in MO at
time it was revived – but if judgment had not yet been revived, MO court could
have denied enforcement).
2.
The Supremecy clause
requires state courts to defer to federal judgments
3.
If a state has a court
of otherwise competent jurisdiction, it must entertain suits on judgment.
4.
Section 1738 requires
federal courts to recognize state court judgments
a)
Federal
courts are not obligated to give preclusive effect to state administrative
agencies, but do so in practice.
b)
Same
principles of full and fair opportunity to litigate apply (Allen – Sec. 1983
claim must be cabined by earlier finding
in criminal trial that search and seizure was reasonable).
5.
Federal common law and
Section 1963 require federal courts to recognize judgments of other federal
courts.
V.
Special Problems in Family Law
A.
Divorce
1.
Since state of Divorce
has interest in its domicilliaries
greater than that of marriage state, divorce forum can apply its own divorce
law without giving deference to policies of marriage state (Williams I – N.C.
pair goes to NV to get divorces, then they marry each other. NC forced to recognize divorces by way of
full faith & credit).
2.
Authority to grant
divorce decree is not based on personal jurisdiction over the couple. Domicile of the plaintiff is sufficient to
allow divorce (absent spouse should receive substituted service that complies
w/ due process). (Id.).
3.
Matrimony not treated
as in-rem or in-personum subject. It is
not a legal “thing,” but rather a status-relationship.
4.
Legal incidences of
marriage can survive divorce (e.g. Estin – alimony from NY separation decree
enforceable despite CT divorce).
a)
Due
process requires personal jurisdiction over spouse to terminate such property
rights (id).
b)
Divorce
is divisible – good as to marital status but ineffective as to issue of
alimony.
5.
Even after ex parte
divorce is granted, spouse can obtain alimony in jurisdiction that has interest
in granting such support (Vanderbilt).
6.
Ichoate interests
won’t vest after divorce has taken place (dower, ERISA benefits, ect.).
7.
Whether forum can
impose child-custody decree on non-resident parent is a murky issue (May v.
Anderson – plurality opinion suggests that second forum has option of enforcing
decree of first forum)
8.
Jurisdiction of
divorce-granting court can be collaterally attacked, as in Williams II, at
least if the issue on which jurisdiction was based was not litigated (finding
that domicile requirments, as defined by NC, were not met in NV).
9.
One state’s finding of
domicil will not be binding for purposes of another states challenge to the
first state’s jurisdiction if the second state overcomes the burden of
establishing that domicil did not in fact exist in the first forum, because
second state has substantial interest in not having matters within its borders
governed by decision of another state
(Williams II ?????).
10.
Party cannot challenge
jurisdiction of rendering court if such party had full and fair opportunity to
litigate the jurisdictional issue in the rendering forum (Sherrer – Appearance
at Fla. Divorce proceedings bars second opportunity to litigate such facts).
11.
Issues regarding SMJ
and PJ are barred res judicata where parties has full and fair opportunity to
litigate them in original forum, an original forum does not permit collateral
attacks on jurisdiction (Id.).
12.
Finality in divorce
proceedings is more important now than state interests in marital relationship
(see id.) (But see Alton, 3d circuit decision invalidating VI divorces on
grounds that interests of domiciliary state are too important to be interfered
with by a territory that has no interest in the couple).
13.
NY court has found
that domicile is not necessary for purposes of jurisdiction to grant divorce
(Rosenshiel – upholding Mexican divorce where party has spent only a few hours
in Mexico, in satisfaction of Mexican requirements) (keep in mind foreign
countries not entitled to FF&C).
14.
State may impose
reasonable restrictions on ability to get divorce, so long as it doesn’t take
away right (Sosna – IA one-year residency requirement upheld).
B.
Child Custody
1.
UCCJA covers:
a)
Determine
jurisdiction
b)
reasons
to decline jurisdiction
c)
Notice
& Opportunity to be heard
d)
Binding
force to previous custody decrees
e)
Simultaneous
proceedings
2.
PKPA covers:
a)
Binding
force of custody decrees
b)
Modification
c)
Notice
& opportunity
d)
Simultaneous
proceedings
3.
Before a court can
attempt to enjoin foreign divorce proceedings, it must look to the UCCJA and
first inquire about the custody issues (Vanneck).
4.
Under UCCJA, court can
exercise jurisdiction over custody determination if it is (see statute for
details)
a)
The
child’s home state, or has been within the last 6 months but was removed by a
contestant and another contenstent continues to live in forum state; or
b)
If
jurisdicition would be in the best interests of the child and substanital
evidence is available in jurisdiction.
5.
If another court is
already exercising jurisdiction in substantial conformity with UCCJA, court
shall not exercise it’s own jurisidiction but will stay its own proceeding and
communicate about the matter with the foreign court (Vanneck).
a)
Maximum
contacts with state, not mininum, should determine which court will exercise
jurisdiction. Contacts closely linked
to availability of relevent evidence.
6.
SMJ over custody
cannot be conferred upon the courts by consent, waiver, or estoppel of parties
(Ben-Yehoshua). Exclusive method of
determining jurisdiction is to follow UCCJA.
7.
Mere physical prescence
of child is neither necessary or sufficient to permit jurisdiction.
8.
Petitioners unclean
hands may result in refusal to exercise jurisdiction, but doctrine is
inapplicable to defendants (Ben-Yehosua
9.
Home-state (or
otherwise relevent) status is determined as of the commencement of the
proceeding, not afterward (B.B.R. – although child lived in DC for most of its
life, CA was most connected state at time mother filed claim). Otherwise, wrongdoers will get rewarded for
their illegal retention of child.
10.
If a child has no home
state, contacts at commencement of proceeding control (Id.).
11.
Court making intitial
award of custody has exclusive jurisdiction over modifications, unless it no
longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise it.
12.
Without a colorable claim
to custody, party might not be a contestant for purposes of the PKPA.
13.
States can exercise
jurisdiction when child is within state borders and an emergency exists (CB
548).
14.
Under PKPA, rendering
forum retains jurisdiction if child or contestant remains in state, whereas
under UCCJA, jurisdiction only lasts as long as both a contestant and the child
are connected to the state.
15.
Second forum must give
notice to non-resident contestent, but personal jurisdiction is not required.
VI. Federal-State Conflicts
A.
Diversity Jurisdiction (Erie)
1.
Diversity must be
complete. No P and D can be from the
same state.
2.
Representative’s
citizenship determined by citizenship of person represented.
3.
Unions are resident of
every state of which a member is a resident
4.
Individual residence
is based on domicile
5.
Amt. in controversey
at time of filing must exceed $75,000
6.
For removal,
conditions must be met at time of filing and time of removal.
7.
There is no diversity
jurisdiction for domestic relation cases
8.
Fed. Judic. Act
requires that federal courts apply state common law as well as statutory law,
except in matters provided for in the constitution or by Act of Congress – fed
cts. may not create or use “federal general common law.” (Erie)
a)
Nor
does congress have power to declare substantive rules of common law
b)
Rationale
for decision is that states must have ability to govern activities within their
borders
c)
Citizens
must know what they can and cannot do, and they can’t know if multiple laws
govern (Hanna, concurrance).
9.
Apparently, Congress
can infer power to create common law on federal courts where such would be
necessary for the enforcement of congressional policy (Lincoln Mills –
collective bargaining agreements should be enforced and commerce clause permits
Congress to do what’s necessary to get them enforced).
10.
Federal courts have
made general maritime law (Jensen).
11.
Federal courts,
whether acting at law or at equity, must provide litigants with substantive
rights created by state law and must not provide substantive rights denied by
state law (York).
12.
There are certain
limitations on what a federal court can do in devising equitable that aren’t
applicable to state courts. Fed cts.
are not limited to remedies available in state ct. (see York, CB 594).
13.
If right to recover is
unavailable in state ct., it cannot be available in fed. ct. (Id.- state SOL
applies)
14.
Substance/Procedure
distinction is not controlling.
Question is whether disregard of
statute (including those dealing with form and mode) that would be controlling in state court would significantly alter the
result of the litigation (York)(“outcome determinative” test)
a)
Outcome
in either court should be substantially the same
b)
Twin
aims of Erie were to prevent forum shopping and to preserve EP, only these
concerns should bear (Hanna, dicta)
c)
Law
not a brooding omnipresence; must be derived from specific source
B.
Applciations of Erie
1.
Look to whether law is
“bound up” with state rights and obligations; if it is, then it must be applied
unless there’s a countervailing federal interest (Byrd), or unless there is a
contrary Federal Rule (Hanna).
a)
It
is necessary to weigh federal policy against state policy (Byrd) when no
Federal Rule is involved.
b)
State
law may not alter essential character or function of federal court (Byrd)
c)
Likelihood
of a different result may determine whether fed practice must yield to state
law (id. – having judge decide an issue instead of jury not likely enough to
change outcome).
2.
If a Federal Rule, as
opposed to federal practice/law, conflicts with state law, Federal Rule applies
unless it falls outside ambit of Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act (Hanna)
a)
Use
Sibbach test: “whether rule really regulates procedure, -the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”
3.
State limit on tolling
period will be enforced b/c to do otherwise would add life to P’s cause of
action, which federal court’s cannot do (Walker).
4.
Federal Rule only
trumps a state law if such rule is of such a broad scope as to collide with
state law (Id. – no clash between Rule 3 and state tolling period).
5.
Fed. Cts. must use
choice-of-law rules of the states that they sit in (Klaxon).
a)
When
case is transferred, tranferor’s state’s laws control choice.
VII. International Conflicts
A.
Legislative Jurisdiction in International Law
1.
Conventional wisdom is
to treat treaties with same deference as federal statutes
2.
Presumption is that
one of 5 bases must be present, otherwise a clear congressional intent says
jurisdiction exists on other basis.
a)
Presumption
against extraterritorial jurisdiction, at least in context of employment
statutes (Aramco – Title VII does not apply to citizens employed abroad by
domestic employer, since its language doesn’t strongly support such an
interpretation)
3.
Courts tend to abide
by 5 bases of jurisdiction (Yunis), but watch carefully for Congressional
intent to override them
a)
National
– D’s nationality
b)
Protective-
Gov’t interest threatened
c)
Territorial
– place of offense
d)
Universal
– any forum w/ physical custody, if D is accused of heinous offense – a crime
condemned by the world community
e)
Passive
personal – victim’s nationality
(1)
Hostage Taking Convention gives states option of exercising
jurisdiction here.
(2)
Generally not a favored basis
4.
In Yunis, universal
and passive personal combined to persuade court to exercise jurisdicition, it
might not have on each ground separately.
5.
Restatement lists 3
types of international jurisdiction:
a)
Jurisdiction
to prescribe – the power of a nation to apply its substantive law to particular
persons or events
b)
Jurisdiction
to adjudicate – power of a nation to subject persons or things to the process
of its courts or administrative tribunals
c)
Jurisdiction
to enforce – the power of a nation to compel compliance or punish noncompliance
with its laws, whether through judicial or nonjudicial action.
6.
Territoriality a
stronger basis than nationality for jurisdiction
7.
SMJ only exists if
Congress says so.
8.
Legislative
Jurisdiction asks when law applies and to whom.
a)
Legislative
jurisdiction should comport w/ treaties.
If it does not comport, Congress should reveal intent not to comport.
b)
9.
The “effects doctrine”
permits jurisdiction when on the basis that foreign activity has or is intended
to have local effects on governmental interests.
10.
General rule is that
whether act was lawful or not must be determined by place of action (Slater).
11.
In determining whether
to apply a constitutional provision to events that took place outside of U.S.,
look to the language of the provision, the history behind its enactment, as
will as the policy wisdom of giving it extraterritorial effect (see e.g.
Verdugo-Urquidez, withholding 4th Amendment protection from Mexican
drug dealer searched and seized in Mexico).
12.
Be sure to review
restatement sections in last reading assignments
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